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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a method for analyzing pilots/crews 
performances. It aims to reduce errors through better 
understanding of interactions between crews and 
operational contexts. It includes a performance analysis 
model which takes into account the crew resources and the 
threats. The model, based on the cognitive information 
processing literature, facilitates the identification of 
failures, with their relationships, and allows to come up 
with realistic dynamic training scenarios. Digital 
visualization tool of those scenarios, provided by the 
model, completes the method. The theoretical part of the 
model has been already used for training in a professional 
environment, for two years. The feed-backs were positive. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Civil and military aviations put a lot of emphasis on the 
analysis of pilot’s performance, on a daily basis or after an 
incident/accident, in order to enhance human performance 
and safety. Therefore a pilot in training is debriefed by 
his/her instructor. A pilot in line operations analyses his/her 
own performance daily, often with structured debriefing 
methods, i.e. the Threat and Error Management (TEM) 
debriefing method, and sometimes as part of a first-hand 
experience feedback. For their part, the operators use 
complementary analysis tools (i.e. flight analysis). All these 
practices are based on the idea that the understanding of 
their activity will allow crews to improve their 
performance. 
The article introduces a method which falls in line with this 
approach : “Accidents are preventable, but only if they are 
correctly described and understood” [9]. Its purpose is to 
be used by pilots, trainers, and any person involved in the 
analysis of aerial events. 
CONTEXT 
Until recently, training programs were still trying to deal  
 
 
 
 
 
with all the situations a crew could come across. But 
experience has shown that accidents scenarios are often 
unpredictable. “It is impossible to foresee all plausible 
accident scenarios, especially in today’s aviation system 
where its complexity and high reliability mean that the next 
accident may be something completely unexpected” [11]. 
This observation led the industry to develop the Evidence 
Based Training (EBT) [11]. It was a major turning point in 
the training of crews, a new training philosophy. 
Developing skills that allow to deal with unusual situations 
became a priority. The scenarios recommended in EBT are 
simply a vehicle and a means to assess and develop 
competence [11]. Trainers are invited to analyse in greater 
depth : “EBT refocuses the instructor population onto 
analysis of the root causes to correct inappropriate 
actions” [11]. This refocusing on skills is in line with 
Captain Dan Maurino's analysis on the relevance of the 
Threat and Error Management, a process integrated in the 
EBT “Operational consideration of human performance in 
aviation had largely overlooked the most important factor 
influencing human performance in dynamic work 
environments: the interaction between people and the 
operational context ... “ [12]. 
To facilitate the performance analysis of crews, several 
theoretical tools or methods have been developed, like The 
Reason’s Model, The Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS), The Integrated Process for 
Investigating Human Factors, The Procedural Event 
Analysis Tool (PEAT) and The Aircrew Incident Reporting 
System (AIRS) [6]. 
The method presented here is looking for the root causes of 
inappropriate actions. It is part of the EBT philosophy. It is 
also close to the AIRS. However the method distinguishes 
itself from these tools by the use of a dynamic model that 
aims to facilitate the identification of the interactions 
between people and the operational context. The use of a 
model in the performance analysis of crews offers many 
advantages : Complexity reduction (visualisation of the 
interactions), better understanding  (in-depth analysis of 
vulnerabilities), systemic and constructivist approach (the 
pilot act as a whole), visualisation of coupling threats (e.g. 
stress will impact situational awareness), reproduction and 
creation of realistic scenarios [1]. 
THE METHOD 
We call performance the result, good or bad, of the crew 
activity. Yet every crew is regularly confronted with 
threats, meaning events or processes likely to seriously 
alter the performance [2]. Some threats, called external 
threats (ET), escape the influence of the crew. Others on 
the contrary, called internal threats (IT), are directly linked 
to the activity of the crew. Using a theoretical model of the 
performance, the method helps to identify and analyse the 
internal threats which brought (or could have brought) 
failure, the impact of the external threats, and all the 
interactions. To complete the model, a visualisation tool of 
the events scenarios helps to understand the dynamic and 
potential effects of the threats. 
The model 
The model includes three levels of analysis : the very 
general one of the domains, the one of the elements, and 
the more specific one of the threats. It offers therefore 
actions, called counter-measures, that reduce the risk of 
errors. 
The domains 
The domains are similar to the SHELL model. They are 5 : 
Aircraft, Environment, Team, Personal Commitment and 
Knowledge. Those are different fields towards which 
thinking and analysis can turn in order to understand 
performance. 
The elements 
The elements, for their part, are the dimensions (or 
variables) which directly determine the performance linked 
to the domains. There are 11 elements combining with the 
domains as follows. For the “Aircraft” domain we can find 
the elements Aircraft control and Procedures. For the 
“Environment” the determining elements are Flight 
conduct, Decision, Situational awareness. For the “Team” 
domain the element is Crew. The domain “Personal 
Commitment” is impacted by the elements Physiology, 
Pressure Management, Attitude, and Stress Management. 
Finally the last element, Knowledge, underlie the 
performance, linked to all the domains (figure 1). 
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Fig. 1 
 
The elements essentially come from the EBT Core 
competencies. However the elements linked to Personal 
Commitment come from our synthesis of Personnel factors 
and Condition of operators (Preconditions for unsafe acts) 
of the method Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS). In this synthesis, to make sure “The Link 
Between Safety Attitudes and Observed Performance in 
Flight Operations” [13] is understood, Attitude has been 
identified as a fully fledged element. 
The threats 
Since the method is following a systemic approach of 
performance, all the threats (internal and external) must be 
taken into account. These threats come from an in-depth 
examination of critical events (first-hand experience, 
investigation reports). Internal threats (there are 80 of 
them), relating to crew failure, are selected according to the 
definition of threats by the Australian CASA : “ …a 
situation or event that has the potential to impact 
negatively on the safety of a flight, or any influence that 
promotes opportunity for pilot errors” [2]. An internal 
threat that will alter the performance being considered a 
failure (F). They have been selected following criteria 
defining each element, i.e. in the Decision element we can 
find a judgement criteria : a threat “Bias of judgement” is 
selected. A review of literature on the most frequent crew 
failures completed the selection [5]. 
External threats complete the performance analysis process. 
Based on the external threats presented in the Threat and 
Error Management process [10], 40 common threats 
classified in 8 families have been selected : Weather, 
Aircraft, ATC, Airport, Organization, Demanding situation, 
Operational constraints, Other threats. Each family presents 
a non-exhaustive list of threats. For example for the 
“Weather” family, we can find Icing conditions, crosswind, 
extreme temperature, etc. Many of these threats have a 
generic scope, like Icing or Unknown situation. They allow 
to discover numerous situations. 
How the model works 
In line with works on cognitive control [4, 8], the elements 
of the model interact with each other with an entry 
“perception” (the input) via the physiology element, and an 
exit “action” (the output) in the Aircraft domain. For each 
element of the model a list of internal threats/failure is 
proposed. From an event, the analysis consists in going 
back up the elements of the model, asking the question 
“why ?” as many times as necessary, looking for failures 
and subsequent problems. With the model, the sequential 
approach of questioning allows to operate links between 
domains, starting from an adverse event related to the 
Aircraft up to the domain Personal Commitment. 
Example 
Let’s take the example of a runway excursion after a series 
of failures (F) of the crew among the different elements 
(el), combined with the emergence of external threats (ET). 
The method consists in answering a succession of 
questions, to approach all the reasons why the aircraft left 
the runway. 
- Why did it leave the runway ? 
Because it was going too fast [Piloting (el) Piloting 
precision (F)] + [Collective (el) Lack of callout (F) of 
the excessive speed]. 
- Why wasn't the announcement made ? 
Because, while landing at night with heavy rain and strong 
crosswind [Demanding situation (ET)], both crew 
members were focusing solely on keeping the runway 
centerline [Situational awareness (el), Focus on one 
flight element (F)]. 
- Why wasn't the contamination of the runway Airport- 
contaminated rwy (ET) taken into account? 
The contamination wasn't announced clearly by the ATC 
[ATC Non standard phraseology (ET)] and the 
workload was important. The crew didn’t catch the 
right information. [Situational Awareness (el) 
Workload Vigilance (F)] + [Team work Lack of 
safety information (F)]. 
 
Possibilities for a more thorough analysis 
In order to analyse a bit more in-depth a particular event, it 
is possible to divide the analysis in several stages, 
following the chronology of the flight, and compiling the 
successive analysis in a tree of failures (figure 2).  
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Fig. 2 
Counter measures 
The analysis of practical cases helps to make understand 
that the performance elements and threats are all variables: 
the situation awareness can be good or bad, the crew can be 
fit or tired, etc. Yet, the crews can act to keep their safety 
margins, either by changing the value of variables (when 
possible), or by limiting their consequences. Thus we can 
oppose a specific list of counter-measures to each threat. 
That way 70% of the activities of a piloting crew can be 
linked to the application of counter-measures. 
To find and understand the significance of counter-
measures, the model also allows the discovery of successful 
recoveries. The way to go about it is the same as described 
previously, the elements simply taking positive values: an 
“excellent” level of piloting, a “good” allocation of tasks, a 
“good” situation awareness that led to a “quick and 
adapted” decision, made easier by “wide” experience, as 
well as “good” stress management. 
Visualisation of the flight dynamic. 
The dynamic nature of flight introduces an important 
dimension of complexity. The perception of operational 
reality, with its time dimension, is therefore sometimes 
difficult to grasp. That is why a scenarios simulator has 
been imagined (work in progress). It relies on the 
visualisation of the control of space/time by the crew. The 
latter having to control his/her aircraft and its immediate 
trajectory between t0 and t+x, as well as its environment 
between t0 and t+y : the crew is “in front/ahead of the 
aircraft”. This control can be represented by two temporal 
dimensions of safety, called Safety Bubbles: one for the 
aircraft and one for the environment (see figure 3). This 
visualisation also allows to detect the priority of tasks 
between t0 (fly) and t+y. The size of these bubbles is 
governed by Aircraft Situation Awareness (SA) and 
Environment SA [7]. 
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Fig. 3 
Safety Bubbles [3] are more or less resistant to the onset of 
threats : they expand or shrink according to the events. In 
cognitive overload, the management of a space happens at 
the expense of the other : the crew is busy solving a 
machine problem, the SA environment decreases, its 
protection bubble retracts, goes behind the aircraft, and the 
risk of CFIT emerges (Controlled Flight Into Terrain) 
The possible uses of the method 
The method must be usable, in auto debriefing within the 
framework of the SPRM (Single Pilot Ressource 
Management) or CRM (Crew Ressource Management) 
trainings, and more generally during all trainings dealing 
with the performance of crews (e.g. Flight instructors). By 
modifying the elements of language as well as the list of 
threats, the method can adapt to different referentials or 
different activities (e.g. Recreational aviation). 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE ORIENTATIONS 
The proposed method is backed up by an in-depth analysis 
of the literature about human factors and psychology. It is 
also based on a thorough analysis of incidents/accidents. 
However, this method remains empirical.  
It needs a minimum of experience from the trainer to be 
used (more so if the crew is using it as an auto-debriefing 
tool). Used by a trainer, it is perfectly suited to analysis for 
teaching purposes (where the result can differ from reality). 
However, even though the method makes analysis easier, it 
must be used with cautions in the search for the reality of 
events. Indeed perfect crews do not exist, and therefore a 
multitude of failures is more likely to be found. Yet if the 
precise weight of each of these failures is not known with 
accuracy, there are true risks of being out of step with 
reality. 
During the development of our theoretical model, if the 
choice of elements was made without too much difficulty, 
thanks to a quite broad agreement in the literature, the 
choice of threats was a lot more difficult because of the 
lack of a precise method of selection. The list of selected 
threats could be improved. 
As it is, what is the method really worth ? The theoretical 
model of analysis has been used by trainers with 240 
instructor pilots in the French Air Force. A questionnaire 
handed to the teaching manager of the trainers brings us the 
following information. The method is quickly assimilated 
by trainees. Used in group work, it provides common 
elements of language that make interactions easier. The 
model facilitates in-depth analysis, with the access to the 
“Commitment” part. Trainers also outline the fact that the 
method is easily assimilable by professionals as well as 
accessible to non-professionals (e.g. glider instructors), but 
is less attractive to the latter. They also insist on the 
importance of simplicity ; some knowledge or process 
presented in the user manual are sometimes hard to grasp. 
If the feedback from the French Air Force is positive (the 
method is integrated in their training process), it will have 
to be refined with a questionnaire addressed to trainees to 
identify more precisely its strong and weak points. This 
evaluation will be made shortly among the trained crews. 
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